Influence of political events on the incentive to suppress negative financial information
Inclusion of both National Congresses and Political Promotions Event Indicators in same estimation (Footnote 15)
The following panels present coefficients from various pooled, cross-sectional estimations of the following model:
Ncskewi,t =  + Year + Province + 1Politicali,t + 2Post-Politicali,t + 3Logsizei,t + 4Growthi,t + 5Sigmai,t + 6Turnoveri,t + 7Turnoveri,t-1 + 8Betai,t + 9Returni,t + 10Returni,t-1 + 10SOEi,t + i,t
The dependent variable Ncskew is the firm's third moment of excess daily stock returns scaled by its cubed standard deviation times minus one. Political is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year relates to a specific political event; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one in the year immediately following the event. In the first set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the years that a National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following each National Congress event, zero otherwise. In the second set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year preceding and corresponding to a provincial level political promotion event, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following the provincial-level promotion event, zero otherwise. In the last set of estimations, indicators variables for both political events are included. All other variables are defined in Table 1 and Appendix A. T-statistics derived using clustered standard errors by province are presented in parentheses. Models include annual and provincial fixed effects [Year and Province, respectively; coefficients not reported]. The superscripts ***,**,* indicate that the estimated coefficient is significantly different than zero at the one, five and ten percent level (two-tailed test), respectively. N=12,723
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Provincial-Level Promotion Both Political Events (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) Table 4B Influence of political events on the incentive to suppress negative financial information
Inclusion of Central Government-owned Firms in Pooled Sample (Footnote 5)
The dependent variable Ncskew is the firm's third moment of excess daily stock returns scaled by its cubed standard deviation times minus one. Political is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year relates to a specific political event; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one in the year immediately following the event. In the first set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the years that a National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following each National Congress event, zero otherwise. In the second set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year preceding and corresponding to a provincial level political promotion event, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following the provincial-level promotion event, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1 Table 4C Influence of political events on the incentive to suppress negative financial information Use of Duvol ("down-to-up" volatility) as alternative measure of stock price crashes (Section 6.1)
Duvoli,t =  + Year + Province + 1Politicali,t + 2Post-Politicali,t + 3Logsizei,t + 4Growthi,t + 5Sigmai,t + 6Turnoveri,t + 7Turnoveri,t-1 + 8Betai,t + 9Returni,t + 10Returni,t-1 + 10SOEi,t + i,t
The dependent variable Duvol is the firm's "down-to-up" volatility, measured as the log of the ratio of the standard deviation of residual returns on down days to the log of the standard deviation of residual returns on up days. Political is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year relates to a specific political event; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one in the year immediately following the event. In the first set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the years that a National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following each National Congress event, zero otherwise. In the second set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year preceding and corresponding to a provincial level political promotion event, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following the provincial-level promotion event, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1 The following panels present coefficients from various pooled, cross-sectional estimations of the following model:
Fractioni,t =  + Year + Province + 1Politicali,t + 2Post-Politicali,t + 3Logsizei,t + 4Growthi,t + 5Sigmai,t + 6Turnoveri,t + 7Turnoveri,t-1 + 8Betai,t + 9Returni,t + 10Returni,t-1 + 10SOEi,t + i,t
The dependent variable Fraction is the percentage of weeks the firm experienced a large negative stock price drop in year t. A large negative stock price drop is measured as a negative return more than 1.96 standard deviations below the sample mean or in excess of -20%, respectively. Political is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year relates to a specific political event; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one in the year immediately following the event. In the first set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the years that a National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following each National Congress event, zero otherwise. In the second set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year preceding and corresponding to a provincial level political promotion event, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following the provincial-level promotion event, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1 and Appendix A. T-statistics derived using clustered standard errors by province are presented in parentheses. The following panels present coefficients from various pooled, cross-sectional estimations of the following model:
NP Skewi,t =  + Year + Province + 1Politicali,t + 2Post-Politicali,t + 3Logsizei,t + 4Growthi,t
The dependent variable NP Skew is the measured as the ratio of the difference in the firm's 95 th percentile and median excess return realization to the difference in the median and 5 th percentile realization in year t. As defined, NP Skew is decreasing in negative skewness. Political is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year relates to a specific political event; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one in the year immediately following the event. In the first set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the years that a National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following each National Congress event, zero otherwise. In the second set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year preceding and corresponding to a provincial level political promotion event, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following the provincial-level promotion event, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1 and Appendix A. Tstatistics derived using clustered standard errors by province are presented in parentheses. Models include annual and provincial fixed effects [Year and Province, respectively; coefficients not reported]. The superscripts ***,**,* indicate that the estimated coefficient is significantly different than zero at the one, five and ten percent level (twotailed test), respectively. N=12,723 The following panels present coefficients from various pooled, cross-sectional estimations of the following model:
The dependent variable Ncskew is the firm's third moment of excess daily stock returns scaled by its cubed standard deviation times minus one. Political is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year relates to a specific political event; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one in the year immediately following the event. In the first set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the years that a National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following each National Congress event, zero otherwise. In the second set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year preceding and corresponding to a provincial level political promotion event, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following the provincial-level promotion event, zero otherwise. In the last set of estimations, indicators variables for both political events are included. All other variables are defined in Table 1 Table 4H Influence of political events on the incentive to suppress negative financial information Using logged returns to estimate equation 1 and construct Ncskew (Section 6.5)
The dependent variable Ncskew is the firm's third moment of excess daily stock returns scaled by its cubed standard deviation times minus one. In this table, Ncskew is estimated from residuals based on estimation of equation (1) using logged returns. Political is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year relates to a specific political event; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one in the year immediately following the event. In the first set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the years that a National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following each National Congress event, zero otherwise. In the second set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year preceding and corresponding to a provincial level political promotion event, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following the provincial-level promotion event, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1 Table 4I Influence of political events on the incentive to suppress negative financial information Using standard errors clustered by province and political event period (footnote 11).
The dependent variable Ncskew is the firm's third moment of excess daily stock returns scaled by its cubed standard deviation times minus one. Political is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year relates to a specific political event; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one in the year immediately following the event. In the first set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the years that a National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following each National Congress event, zero otherwise. In the second set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year preceding and corresponding to a provincial level political promotion event, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following the provincial-level promotion event, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1 The following panels present select coefficients from pooled, cross-sectional estimations of the following model:
Ncskewi,t =  + Year + Province + 1Politicali,t +2Politicali,t*Hong Kongi,t + 3Post-Politicali,t + 4Post-Politicali,t*Hong Kongi,t + 5Hong Kongi,t-1 + 6LogSizei,t + 7Growthi,t + 8Sigmai,t + 9Turnoveri,t + 10Turnoveri,t-1 + 11Betai,t + 12Returni,t + 13Returni,t-1 + i,
The dependent variable Ncskew is the firm's third moment of excess daily stock returns scaled by its cubed standard deviation times minus one. Political is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year relates to a specific political event; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one in the year immediately following the event. In the first set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the years that a National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following each National Congress event, zero otherwise. In the second set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year preceding and corresponding to a provincial level political promotion event, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following the provincial-level promotion event, zero otherwise. For each event, the model is estimated using three samples: (1) a reduced form of the empirical model is estimated using a small sample of Hong Kong-listed Chinese firms (first column), (2) the full model is estimated using a pooled sample of Hong Kong-listed Chinese firms and (3) the full model is estimated using a pooled sample of Hong Kong-listed Chinese firms and the top quartile of our sample of mainland listed Chinese firms by firm size (third column). In the second and third estimations, Hong Kong is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year relates to a Chinese firm with a Hong Kong cross-listing, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1 The following panels present coefficients from various pooled, cross-sectional estimations of the following model:
Log(1+Articlesi,t) or Log(1+Articlesi,t/Sizei,t) =  + Year + Province + 1Pre-Political [-6,-4] 
The dependent variable, Articlesi,t, is one of two measures capturing the number of news articles published about firm i in year t in either official or professional newspapers. Log(1+Articlesi,t) is a logarithmic transformation of the number of articles published. Log(1+Articlesi,t/Sizei,t) is a logarithmic transformation of the number of articles published scaled by the market value of the firm (in RMB billions). Pre-Political is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-month precedes a specific political event over the indicated range; zero otherwise. Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-month follows the political event over the indicated range, zero otherwise. In the first set of estimations, Pre-Political and Post-Political relate to the months preceding and following the month that the National Congress of the CCP was held. In the second set of estimations, Pre-Political and Post-Political relate to the months surrounding a provincial level political promotion event. For each political event, the first (second) set of estimations reflects articles published in official (professional/financial) newspapers. All other variables are defined in Table 1 The following panels present coefficients from various pooled, cross-sectional estimations of the following model:
Fraction_Jumpsi,t =  + Year + Province + 1Politicali,t + 2Post-Politicali,t + 3Logsizei,t + 4Growthi,t + 5Sigmai,t + 6Turnoveri,t + 7Turnoveri,t-1 + 8Betai,t + 9Returni,t + 10Returni,t-1 + 10SOEi,t + i,t
The dependent variable Fraction_Jumps is the percentage of weeks the firm experienced a large positive stock price increase, or "jump," in year t. A large positive stock price jump is measured as a positive return more than 1.96 standard deviations above the sample mean or more than 20%. Political is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year relates to a specific political event; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one in the year immediately following the event. In the first set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the years that a National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following each National Congress event, zero otherwise. In the second set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year preceding and corresponding to a provincial level political promotion event, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following the provincial-level promotion event, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1 and Appendix A. T-statistics derived using clustered standard errors by province are presented in parentheses. Models include annual and provincial fixed effects [Year and Province, respectively; coefficients not reported]. The superscripts ***,**,* indicate that the estimated coefficient is significantly different than zero at the one, five and ten percent level (two-tailed test), respectively. N=12,723 Table B Influence of political events on the incentive to defer release of "good news": Stock Price Jumps before, during and after political event periods (Section 6.2)
Fraction_Jumpsi,t =  + Year + Province + 1Pre-Political + 2Politicali,t + 3Post-Politicali,t + 4Logsizei,t + 5Growthi,t + 6Sigmai,t + 7Turnoveri,t + 8Turnoveri,t-1 + 9Betai,t + 10Returni,t + 11Returni,t-1 + 12SOEi,t + i,t
The dependent variable Fraction_Jumps is the percentage of weeks the firm experienced a large positive stock price increase, or "jump," in year t. A large positive stock price jump is measured as a positive return more than 1.96 standard deviations above the sample mean or more than 20%. Political is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year relates to a specific political event; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one in the year immediately following the event; Pre-Political is an indicator variable equal to one in the year directly preceding the measurement of the political event. In the first set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the years that a National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following each National Congress event, zero otherwise. In the second set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year preceding and corresponding to a provincial level political promotion event, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following the provincial-level promotion event, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1 and Appendix A. T-statistics derived using clustered standard errors by province are presented in parentheses. Models include annual and provincial fixed effects [Year and Province, respectively; coefficients not reported]. The superscripts ***,**,* indicate that the estimated coefficient is significantly different than zero at the one, five and ten percent level (two-tailed test), respectively. N=12,723 The following panels present coefficients from various pooled, cross-sectional estimations of the following model:
Ncskewi,t =  + Year + Province + 1Pre-Political + 2Politicali,t + 3Post-Politicali,t + 4Logsizei,t + 5Growthi,t + 6Sigmai,t + 7Turnoveri,t + 8Turnoveri,t-1 + 9Betai,t + 10Returni,t + 11Returni,t-1 + 12SOEi,t + i,t
The dependent variable Ncskew is the firm's third moment of excess daily stock returns scaled by its cubed standard deviation times minus one. A large negative stock price drop is measured as a negative return more than 1.96 standard deviations above the sample mean. Political is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year relates to a specific political event; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one in the year immediately following the event; Pre-Political is an indicator variable equal to one in the year directly preceding the measurement of the political event. In the first set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the years that a National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following each National Congress event, zero otherwise. In the second set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year preceding and corresponding to a provincial level political promotion event, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following the provincial-level promotion event, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1 and Appendix A. T-statistics derived using clustered standard errors by province are presented in parentheses. The following panels present coefficients from various pooled, cross-sectional estimations of the following model:
ROAi,t or Investmenti,t =  + Year + 1Province + 1Politicali,t + 1Post-Politicali,t + 2Logsizei,t + 3Growthi,t + 4Sigmai,t + 5Turnoveri,t + 6Turnoveri,t-1 + 7Betai,t + 8Returni,t + 9Returni,t-1 + i,t
The dependent variables ROAi,t and Investmenti,t is the firm's return on assets realization (defined as net income scaled by beginning assets) and investment rate (defined as capital expenditures scaled by beginning assets), respectively, in year t. Political is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year relates to a specific political event; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one in the year immediately following the event. In the first set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the years that a National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following each National Congress event, zero otherwise. In the second set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year preceding and corresponding to a provincial level political promotion event, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following the provincial-level promotion event, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1 Table E1 Influence of capital market forces on incentives to suppress negative financial information (Section 5.
3)
The following panels present select coefficients from pooled, cross-sectional estimations of the following model:
Ncskewi,t =  + Year + Province + 1Politicali,t +2Politicali,t*Attributei,t + 3Post-Politicali,t + 4Post-Politicali,t*Attributei,t + 5Attributei,t-1 + 6LogSizei,t + 7Growthi,t + 8Sigmai,t + 9Turnoveri,t + 10Turnoveri,t-1 + 11Betai,t + 12Returni,t + 13Returni,t-1 + 14SOEi,t + i,
The dependent variable Ncskew is the firm's third moment of excess daily stock returns scaled by its cubed standard deviation times minus one. In these estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year of a National Congress meeting (first set of estimations) or the year preceding and corresponding to a provincial-level political promotion event (second set of estimations), zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following the specific political event, zero otherwise. Attribute captures one of two proxies for capital market incentives for transparency: (1) the relative importance of equity markets at the provincial level and (2) whether the firm issued B-shares. In the first estimation, Attribute is an indicator variable equal to one if the total market capitalization of all listed firms in the province, scaled by provincial GDP, is in the top half of the sample, zero otherwise. In the second estimation, Attribute is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm also issued a class of B-share securities. All other variables are defined in Table 1 Table E2 Influence of capital market forces on incentives to suppress negative financial information (Section 5.
The dependent variable Ncskew is the firm's third moment of excess daily stock returns scaled by its cubed standard deviation times minus one. In these estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year of a National Congress meeting (first set of estimations) or the year preceding and corresponding to a provincial-level political promotion event (second set of estimations), zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following the specific political event, zero otherwise. Attribute captures one of two proxies for capital market incentives for transparency: (1) the relative importance of equity markets at the provincial level and (2) whether the firm issued B-shares. In the first estimation, Attribute is an indicator variable equal to one if the total market capitalization of all listed firms in the province, scaled by provincial GDP, is in the top half of the sample, zero otherwise. In the second estimation, Attribute is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm also issued a class of B-share securities. All other variables are defined in Table 1 Table F Relation between political events and annual realized returns
Market-adjusted Returni,t =  + Year + 1Politicali,t + 2Post-Politicali,t + 3Logsizei,t + 4Market-to-booki,t + 5Market-adjusted Returni,t-1 + i,t
The dependent variable Market-adjusted Returni,t is the annual market-adjusted return of firm i in year t. Political is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm-year relates to a specific political event; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one in the year immediately following the event. In the first set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the years that a National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following each National Congress event, zero otherwise. In the second set of estimations, Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year preceding and corresponding to a provincial level political promotion event, zero otherwise; Post-Political is an indicator variable equal to one for the year directly following the provincial-level promotion event, zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 1 
